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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ALLEN DWAINE OLSEN, MICHAEL 
PAYNE WARWICK and DONALD RAY 
HATCH, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 880269-CA 
Category No. 2 
Counsel for Defendants-Appellants reassert and rely upon the 
facts as set forth in the Appellants1 brief and Respondent's 
brief previously filed in this case. 
REPLY POINT I 
THE PROSECUTION HAD A DUTY TO DISCLOSE THE INCULPATORY ORAL 
STATEMENTS OF EACH DEFENDANT 
The State has responded that because counsel for Defendants 
made no specific written requests for disclosure of Defendants1 
oral statements, it was proper for the prosecution to withhold 
information as to the existence and substance of Defendants' oral 
statements. In reply, Defendants assert that such disclosure was 
required both by Section 77-35-l6(a) (1) and by the holdings of 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
Section 77-35-l6(a)(1) requires the prosecution - on request 
-to disclose ff[r]elevant written or recorded statements of the 
defendant or co-defendants[.]" Requests for disclosure of each 
Defendants statements were made by both defense counsel who each 
couched their requests substantially in the exact wording of the 
statute. In his RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY the prosecutor 
1 
responded to Defendants1 requests for statements by stating 
"[t]he Wayne County Prosecutor has no knowledge of any written or 
recorded statements of the Defendants." Later, at a pre-trial 
suppression hearing the prosecutor disclosed an oral statement by 
Defendant, Hatch (transcript of suppression hearing, page 39); in 
opening argument he made reference to a purported oral admission 
of guilt by Defendant Michael Warwick (T. 15); and during the 
testimony of a Wayne County Deputy Sheriff he attempted to 
introduce a purported oral statement attributed to Defendant, 
Olsen (T.91). 
The State's trial and appellate counsel have each sought to 
justify such non-disclosures based on a strict interpretation of 
the Section's reference to only "written and recorded statements" 
and on Defendants' adoption of the statutory language without 
additional specific references to oral statements in their 
respective requests. Appellate counsel has cited several cases 
from other jurisdictions in support of the State's position but 
none from Utah. Defendants have likewise been unable to discover 
Utah cases directly on point. The State has further argued on 
appeal that, at any rate, it would be too burdensome for 
prosecutors to have to disclose the oral statements of 
defendants. 
Defendants here argue that this Court should rule that 
inculpatory oral statements fall within the meaning and intent of 
Section 77-35-16(a)(1 ) and that any relevant inculpatory 
statements by defendants - written, recorded, memorized, 
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characterized, or paraphrased - be disclosed upon proper and 
timely request. Such a ruling would place no additional burden on 
a prosecutor who intends to preserve an inculpatory oral 
statement for his own use - as in this case - and would promote 
the openness and fairness on which the criminal justice system is 
founded. 
A ruling that a remembered oral statement does not fall 
within the parameters of the statute would promote no purpose 
other than to condone knowing and purposeful withholding of 
critical evidence, would encourage police and prosecutors to 
refrain from recording statements in order to hide them from 
defense counsel and would reward bad faith and gamesmanship. 
The intent of this Section is to require full disclosure 
upon request, not to provide a place for prosecutors to hide 
evidence by splitting hairs. This court should rule that the 
inculpatory oral statements that the prosecutor sought to use in 
this matter fell within the meaning and intent of the Section and 
that a duty existed to disclose both the existence and substance 
of the statements. This Court should not legitimize the 
intentional hiding of material evidence exemplified by this case. 
If this Court rules that oral statements don't fall within 
Section 77-35-l6(a)(1) the Court should nevertheless find that 
they fall within Section 77-35-l6(a)(5) and that principals 
enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court required their disclosure. 
The State correctly points out that the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v Knight, 734 P.2d 913, promulgated the following rule: 
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[W]hen the prosecution chooses to respond voluntarily 
to a request under subsection (a)(5) without requiring 
the defense to obtain a court order, considerations of 
fairness require that the prosecution respond to the 
request in a manner that will not be misleading. 
[T]he prosecution either must produce all of the 
material requested or must identify explicitly those 
portions of the request with respect to which no 
responsive material will be provided. Knight, supra. 
In an earlier case the Supreme Court held that 
even though there is no court-ordered disclosure, 
a prosecutor's failure to disclose newly discovered 
inculpatory information which falls within the gambit 
of [Section] 77-35-l6(a), after the prosecution has 
made a voluntary disclosure of evidence might so 
mislead the defendant as to cause prejudicial error. 
State v Carter, 707 P.2d 656. 
As the State has indicated, at a pre-trial suppression 
hearing the prosecution asked its witness to relate an oral 
statement made by Defendant, Hatch and Hatch's counsel, Mr. 
Esplin, objected citing the prosecution's previous negative 
response to the request for Defendants' statements. The 
prosecutor responded "Your request was 'any written or recorded 
statements'. There are statements of the defendants that were 
made to the officers. And I denied there were any others. We 
don't have any." The objection was overruled and the witness 
responded, "Mr. Hatch replied, 'I don't know.'" (Transcript of 
Suppression Hearing at page 39.) 
Although not voluntarily disclosed in the strictest since of 
that word, the oral statement of one of the Defendants was 
disclosed by the prosecutor, through the testimony of his own 
witness at pre-trial hearing. His ambiguous response to counsel's 
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objection coupled with the denial in paragraph 1 of his written 
response to the two requests for discovery implied no other oral 
statements existed either from this Defendant or from the other 
two Defendants. The harm resulting from this type of 
misrepresentation or misunderstanding was addressed by the Court 
in Knight which noted that it 
has the effect of representing to the defense that 
the evidence does not exist. In reliance on this 
misleading representation, the defense might abandon 
lines of independent investigation, defenses, or trial 
strategies that it otherwise would have pursued. 
Knight, supra, citing United States v Bagley, 473 US 
GUT? 
This Court should carefully scrutinize the issue of the 
prosecutor's duty of disclosure raised in this case. It involves 
evidence that was unquestionably critical to a fair and complete 
defense of the charges; it involves Defendants' right of 
confrontation; it involves information bearing directly on the 
ethical responsibilities of one of the defense counsel who was 
representing two of the Defendants jointly; retention of the 
information served no compelling State interest; it was obviously 
purposefully withheld; it was withheld despite two separate, 
timely, good faith requests for its disclosure; it involves a 
question of apparent first impression; it is central to the 
criminal justice system which the Utah Supreme Court has said f'is 
a real quest for truth and not simply a contest between the 
parties to win", Knight, supra. But most importantly, the 
withholding of the information violated Defendants' rights to a 
fair trial and due process. 
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Defendants urge that since they had requested disclosure of 
statements made by each of the Defendants, since the prosecutor 
denied the existence of written or recorded statements while 
failing to explicitly and clearly identify that he had knowledge 
of oral statements or that he intended not to disclose them, and 
since he ultimately disclosed one of the oral statements but 
concealed the others, the underlying principals of Knight and 
Carter controlled here and required that the prosecutor disclose 
all oral statements rather than just one. Defendants further urge 
that his failure to do so mislead the Defendants as to the 
existence and substance of the additional oral statements, 
dissuaded them from pursuing legitimate lines of defense, 
investigation, and trial strategy, and violated the principal 
stated in Knight, Bagley, and Carter that he make full disclosure 
or explicitly and specifically identify those portions of the 
request to which he would not respond. 
REPLY POINT II 
THE PROSECUTOR'S VIOLATION OF THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE THE ORAL 
STATEMENTS OF DEFENDANTS AND HIS REFERENCE IN HIS OPENING 
STATEMENT TO A NON-DISCLOSED ORAL STATEMENT OF A DEFENDANT WAS 
IMPROPER AND WAS NOT HARMLESS 
This [Supreme] Court has adopted a two-part test 
for determining whether a prosecutor's remark warrants 
reversal: (1) did the remarks call to the attention of 
the jurors matters which they could not properly 
consider in determining their verdict, and (2) were the 
jurors under the circumstances of the particular case 
probably influenced by those remarks. State v Tucker, 
727 P.2d 185, citing State v Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 
State v Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, and State v Bailey, 712 
P.2d 281. See also State v Slowe, 728 P.2d 110, State v 
Speer, 750 P.2d 186, State v Tillman, 750 P.2d 54b, and 
State v Gardner, 101 P.2d 3. 
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In his opening statement, State's counsel told the jury that 
a deputy Wayne County Sheriff would testify that Defendant 
Warwick stated after his arrest and after being advised that he 
would have to appear at the justice of the peace to be officially 
advised of the charges, "We are not going through all that 
rigmarole ... I'm guilty and I know it." (T. 15) The jury could 
not properly have considered this evidence for two reasons; 
first, this statement was improperly withheld from Defendants in 
spite of timely and proper written request for disclosure and in 
spite of the prosecutors duty to disclose it, as has been argued 
elsewhere herein; and second, because it violated the other 
Defendants' rights of confrontation as interpreted in Bruton v 
United States, 391 US 123. 
The State has argued that the Bruton principal does not 
apply to this statement for the reason that Warwick's statement 
does not demonstrate his co-defendants' guilt. As authority, the 
State cites State v Ellis & Withers, 748 P.2d 188. In Ellis the 
two defendants were found in a car near a crime scene apparently 
sleeping. When asked what they were doing they gave inconsistent 
statements about the length of time they had been in the car and 
about how long the car had been parked at that location. The 
Supreme Court rightfully concluded that-
These factually inconsistent statements reflect 
each defendant's efforts to exculpate himself. They 
certainly support an inference that one or both were 
not telling the truth about how long the car had been 
parked, but they do not rise to the level of directly 
implicating either defendant in the crime charged. 
Therefore, Bruton does not come in to play, and the 
trial court was not compelled to sever the trials or 
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exclude the testimony. E l l i s , supra. 
In con t r a s t , Warwick's purported statement i s a d i r ec t and 
unequivocal admission of g u i l t of the crime charged, a l legedly 
spoken by one of t h r e e occupants of a t ruck towing an open 
t r a i l e r f u l l of a l l e g e d l y s t o l e n c a t t l e . As such, i t was "a 
powerfully and f a c i a l l y incr iminat ing" statement with respect to 
a l l three occupants of the truck and d i r e c t l y implicated each of 
the occupants of the veh ic le . As such i t was r i gh t fu l ly excluded 
by the t r i a l court under the p r inc ipa l s of Bruton and was not a 
matter tha t the jury could have properly considered. 
The second prong of the p r o s e c u t o r i a l misconduct t e s t i s 
meant to de termine whe the r t h e imprope r r emarks p r o b a b l y 
in f luenced the jury in t h e i r d e l i b e r a t i o n . In other words, was 
the p r o s e c u t o r f s e r r o r h a r m l e s s . The Utah Supreme Court has 
defined the "reasonable p robab i l i ty" of a more favorable r e su l t 
as one tha t undermines the c o u r t ' s conf idence in the outcome, 
Knight , supra , as opposed to an e r r o r t h a t was " su f f i c i en t ly 
i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l t h a t we c o n c l u d e t h e r e i s no r e a s o n a b l e 
l i k e l i h o o d t h a t t h e e r r o r a f f e c t e d t h e o u t c o m e of t h e 
p r o c e e d i n g s . " S t a t e v Verde, 101 Utah Advance Reports 37. In 
Knight , the Court ru led t h a t in cases i nvo lv ing f a i l u r e to 
d i s c l o s e i n c u l p a t o r y ev idence , once the defendant has made a 
c r e d i b l e argument t h a t the defense has been impaired by the 
p rosecu to r ' s e r r o r s , the State has the burden of persuading the 
appe l la te court tha t there was not a reasonable l ikel ihood of a 
more favorable verdict for the defendant, absent the e r r o r . This 
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assessment is made with an eye toward the totality of the trial, 
Speer, supra. 
The State has acknowledged that the only issue in this 
matter for the jury to consider was whether the Defendants knew, 
or should have known, that the cattle were owned rather than 
wild, and whether the Defendants therefore had an intent to 
deprive the owner of his/her property. It is undisputed that the 
cattle were taken from an unfenced and unmarked grazing allotment 
consisting of over 200,000 acres situated on public lands open to 
public ingress and egress and that the grazing area is one of 
only three in the state that is grazed year-round; that the 
cattle bore no outward marks of ownership or husbandry such as 
brands, tatoos, or earmarks, and that they weren't castrated nor 
were their horns cut. The Defendants were transporting the cattle 
in an open trailer during daylight hours over a route that passed 
directly by a BLM ranger station. The only road into and out of 
the area where the cattle were taken bore no signs of maintenance 
or passage. Defendant Hatch testified that the three Defendants 
observed no signs of ownership or regular human activity in the 
area such litter, vehicle tracks, salt licks, water, feed, or 
horse tracks. He did not deny being in possession of the animals 
nor that he had come to the area with the specific intent of 
rounding up and removing cattle. He testified, however, that had 
they seen any sign of ownership on any cattle they saw-
including those they didn't catch - they would not have taken any 
of the animals. 
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Although the court did not allow the prosecutor to introduce 
the non-disclosed oral statements in its case in chief (T.50) it 
did allow that the statements could be used in rebuttal (T.91). 
Consequently, in an effort to minimize the damage that would have 
been caused by introduction of the purported oral admissions in 
rebuttal, neither Defendants Warwick nor Olsen testified in 
corroboration of Defendant Hatch's testimony. 
The jury deliberated for more than three hours presumably on 
the single issue of intent. Clearly, Defendants' credibility was 
critical to their defense that they had no knowledge that the 
cattle were owned and that they therefore had no intent to 
deprive the owner of his property. And clearly their defense was 
impaired by the prosecution's failure to disclose the various 
oral statements and his improper reference in opening argument to 
a purported contrary admission of guilt by one of the Defendants. 
The impairment was to the credibility of the Defendant Hatch who 
did testify as to the Defendants' lack of intent as well as to 
the effect on Defendants Warwick's and Olsen's decision not to 
testify in corroboration thereof. 
The withholding of requested evidence also affected 
Defendants' pre-trial strategy and preparation. Had the oral 
statements been discovered and had the Defendants denied the 
statements, defense counsel would have had time to investigate to 
determine the credibility of the declarants and to develope 
contradicting evidence. If Defendants had admitted the 
statements, trial might probably have been avoided. With prior 
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knowledge of the purportedly incriminating statements counsel 
would have been alerted to the need to move to suppress, severe, 
and probably withdraw from joint representation of both Warwick 
and 01sen. 
Defendants have made a credible argument that their defense 
was impaired by the prosecutor's misconduct and that the 
misconduct was not so inconsequential that this court can 
conclude there was no reasonable likelihood that the outcome of 
the trial was thereby effected. As evidence that there was not a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
Defendants, absent such misconduct, the State has merely stated, 
as a conclusion, that there was "evidence of defendants1 guilt". 
However, the improper comment did not merely add more weight to 
the circumstantial evidence the jury was about to consider, nor 
was it merely cumulative or a repetition of otherwise admissable 
evidence. Rather, it constituted the only source of such 
admission, directly contradicted the only defensive theory, and 
undermined the Defendants1 credibility which was critical to such 
defense. The State's burden under Knight in this regard is not to 
show that there was evidence in support of the verdict but to 
show that the misconduct did not have a substantial effect on the 
verdict. The State has not and can not do so in light of the 
defense put forth and the directly contradictory nature of the 
inadmissable oral statement referenced by the prosecutor in his 
opening statement. This Court should therefore conclude that the 
State has failed to establish that the prosecutor's misconduct 
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did not substantially influence the outcome of the trial, that 
such improper influence undermines confidence in the verdict, and 
that the judgment based thereon should be reversed. 
REPLY POINT III 
DEFENDANTS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO RELIEF FROM THE 
PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THEIR ORAL STATEMENTS AND FROM 
THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT 
The State has argued that Defendants have waived their right 
to challenge any claims of violation of the prosecutor's duty to 
disclose and of prosecutorial misconduct for three reasons: 
first, Defendants didn't specifically request the oral 
statements; second, Defense counsel knew of or should have been 
able to learn of the existence and substance of the oral 
statements without need for disclosure by the State; and, third, 
Defendants did not seek proper relief for the claimed errors at 
the trial level. 
Defendants' reply to the first reason is stated elsewhere 
herein. 
As to the second reason, the State points to two sources 
from which defense counsel should have known about the oral 
statements later used against them. The first was Sheriff Ekker. 
The second was the prosecutor. 
Both State trial and appellate counsel hint that Sheriff 
Ekker advised defense counsel of Defendants' oral admissions on 
the day of the preliminary examination (8 September, 1987), 
although no record is referred to in support of the claims. 
Without admitting such disclosure but assuming, arguendo, that 
12 
reference to such admissions was made by the Sheriff as claimed, 
it should be noted that both defense counsel filed proper written 
requests for discovery within a few weeks of the preliminary 
examination. Such requests would have been the reasonable and 
proper response to the Sheriff's purported advice in order that 
the prosecutor could verify the existence of the statements and 
specify which Defendant said what to whom. Any clues to the 
statements that might have been gained from the Sheriff were 
cooled by the prosecutor's subsequent misleading negative 
response to the requests for disclosure. 
The second purported collateral source of the statements was 
the prosecutor himself. He and appellate counsel claim disclosure 
was made in the response to the requests for discovery and at the 
suppression hearing. 
As elsewhere noted, the written response to the requests for 
discovery clearly gives no overt indication of the existence or 
substance of any oral statements. 
A review of the transcript of the suppression hearing 
reveals that only one reference was made to oral statements (page 
39). It came in response to and addressed an objection to an 
attempt to introduce a specific oral statement from Defendant, 
Hatch. It is cryptic in its purported reference to other 
statements. It reveals the substance of only the one statement 
from Defendant, Hatch, and no others. In it the prosecutor 
states, "I denied there were any others. We don't have any." It's 
evident from the pattern of the prosecutor's written and oral 
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responses that his intent was to conceal rather than to reveal 
the oral statements. The State cannot claim it has disclosed 
information that it has hidden in a maze of obstructive and 
misleading statements. 
Thirdly, the State has asserted that Defendants failed to 
make a timely effort to obtain relief from the prosecutor's 
misconduct, specifically, that defense counsel did not move for 
continuance or mistrial. The State notes the Utah Supreme Court's 
recognition of the timely motions of defense counsel in Knight as 
opposed to the failure of defense counsel to make such motions in 
State v Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879. However, in Griffiths the Court 
found that defense counsel was made aware of defendant's 
statements in advance of trial and nevertheless failed to seek a 
continuance to investigate. Whereas, in this matter, despite the 
claims of the State, defense counsel had no prior knowledge of 
the purported statements of Defendants Warwick and Olsen until 
the prosecutor disclosed one in opening statement and another 
during testimony at trial, after a jury had been impanelled. 
Defendants therefore had no reasonable opportunity to seek a pre-
trial continuance to investigate as in Griffiths. 
Further, immediately upon hearing the prosecutor's reference 
to the purported statements in the opening argument, defense 
counsel sought a bench conference, an instruction to refrain from 
further improper comment by the prosecutor, and an exclusion of 
the statement from evidence. While the trial court instructed the 
prosecutor to make no more reference to the statement and 
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excluded it from the State's case in chief, the court indicated 
the statement would be allowed for rebuttal purposes. Defendants 
did seek immediate relief which was granted in part and denied in 
part. Finally, the State seems to cite Griffiths for the 
proposition that the only relief that should be sought for 
prosecutorial misconduct is either a continuance or a mistrial. 
Although the Court indicated Griffiths' counsel could have 
mitigated damage by seeking a continuance, the case does not hold 
that a continuance or mistrial is the only proper form of relief 
in all situations. The exigencies of each case should dictate the 
proper form of relief. While the defendants in Knight and 
Griffiths may have been well served by a continuance or 
declaration of mistrial, that does not mean that all defendants 
in all cases are similarly well served by such relief. 
In this matter a two-day trial was held in Loa. Defendants 
resided in Emery and Carbon Counties. Defense counsel resided and 
practiced in Provo. The trial judge sat in Sanpete County and had 
jurisdiction over several counties. The trial was set some five 
months after the alleged crime to comport with the trial court's 
unusual schedule. The prosecutor practiced in Richfield. The 
trial constituted a great expense to Defendants due to the need 
for them, their families, and their counsel to appear and defend 
away from their homes and offices. A continuance or rescheduling 
of the trial would have necessitated further financial burden and 
would have effectively constituted a waiver of speedy trial due 
to the trial court's extended territorial responsibilities and 
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c o n s e q u e n t i a l t ime r e s t r i c t i o n s . While a p a r t i c u l a r form of 
r e l i e f may be preferred and proper in a s e t t i n g where delay of 
the t r i a l would r e su l t in no untoward hardship on the defendant, 
in t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i t was p r o p e r and r e a s o n a b l e fo r 
D e f e n d a n t s t o seek e x c l u s i o n of t h e evidence r a t h e r than 
continuance or m i s t r i a l . And, as the Court in Knight s t a t e d , " i f 
the t r i a l court denies the r e l i e f reques ted under Rule 1 6 ( g ) , 
t h a t d e n i a l may cons t i t u t e an abuse of d i sc re t ion warranting a 
r e v e r s a l . " 
This Court should rule that Defendants took all appropriate 
steps under the circumstances of the case to mitigate and 
preserve their right to appeal from the damage done by the 
prosecutor's failure to disclose and improper conduct in opening 
statement. The matter should be reversed by reason of the 
prosecutor's errors and the trial court's abuse of discretion in 
refusing to exclude the oral statements of the Defendants Warwick 
and Olsen in the State's rebuttal as well as in its case in 
chief. 
REPLY POINT IV 
THE STATE HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THERE WAS EVIDENCE FROM 
WHICH REASONABLE MINDS COULD HAVE FOUND DEFENDANTS GUILTY 
Defendants resisted the charge of cattle theft asserting 
they came to the area for the admitted purpose of rounding up the 
cattle, but claiming they took them under the reasonable and 
mistaken belief that they were wild. There defense was founded on 
Section 76-2-304, Utah Code. 
The State, in its responsive brief, has countered that the 
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jury had substantial evidence before it from which it could have 
reasonably concluded that on other dates, other persons saw 
indications of ownership on other cattle, somewhere within the 
200,000+ acre expanse of the owner's grazing allotment. The State 
also points to evidence that - not surprisingly - the Sheriff and 
his cousin A.C. Ekker, the actual owner if the cattle, did not 
believe the Defendants didn't know the cattle were owned. 
The State does not dispute, however, that the cattle in 
question bore absolutely no outward signs of ownership, that the 
area from which they were taken gave no other indication that the 
cattle were owned or managed, that Defendant, Hatch was truthful 
in his testimony that the Defendants took great care to be sure 
none of the cattle they encountered that day bore signs of 
ownership and that the cattle had a wild and untended appearance, 
or that the Defendants made no attempts to conceal their admitted 
purpose to gather the cattle. Essentially, the State has pointed 
to no evidence that would support the jury's concluding against 
the Defendants' claim of mistake of fact, as opposed to evidence 
that other persons on other dates, saw other cattle, at other 
locations, that did carry brands. The jury had no evidence before 
it - except for the inadmissable purported admission of Michael 
Warwick, improperly stated by the prosecutor - from which it 
could have reasonably concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the Defendants were not acting under a reasonable mistake of fact 
when they took the cattle. 
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CONCLUSION 
In summation, counsel for Defendants-Appellants reaffirm the 
prosecution had a duty to disclose the inculpatory oral 
statements of each defendant. In addition, the prosecutor's 
violation of the duty to disclose the oral statements of 
Defendants and his reference in his opening statement to a non-
disclosed oral statement of a Defendant was improper and was not 
harmless. Further, Defendants did not waive their right to 
relief from the prosecutor's failure to disclose their oral 
statements and from the prosecutor's misconduct. Finally, the 
State has not established that there was evidence from which 
reasonable minds could have found Defendants guilty. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this & day of March, 1989. 
MICHAEL D. ^ S P L I N ~ 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
Hatch 
/ 
THOMAS H. MEANS 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants 
Warwick and Olsen 
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ADDENDUM 
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79 CRIMINAL CODE 76-2-401 
as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant 
was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's mo-
tion shall be made at least ten days before trial ex-
cept the court for good cause shown may permit a 
later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant 
was entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with preju-
dice, but if the court determines the defendant was 
not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the 
defendant to the jury at trial. Any order by the court 
dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be ap-
pealable by the state. 
(6) In any hear ing before a judge or jury where the 
defense of en t rapment is an issue, past offenses of the 
defendant shall not be admit ted except tha t in a tr ial 
where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his 
past convictions for felonies and any testimony given 
by the defendant a t a hear ing on en t rapment may be 
used to impeach his test imony a t tr ial . 1973 
76-2-304. Ignorance or mis take of fact or law. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mis-
take of fact which disproves the culpable mental state 
is a defense to any prosecution for that crime. 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence 
or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime 
unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor 
reasonably believed his conduct did not consti-
tute an offense, and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the 
actor's reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law con-
tained in a written order or grant of permis-
sion by an administrative agency charged by 
law with responsibility for interpreting the 
law in question; or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law 
contained in an opinion of a court of record or 
made by a public servant charged by law 
with responsibility for interpreting the law 
in question. 
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of 
fact or law may constitute a defense to the offense 
charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser 
included offense of which he would be guilty if the 
fact or law were as he believed. 1974 
76-2-304.5. Mistake as to victim's age not a de-
fense. 
(1) It is not a defense to the crime of child kidnap-
ing, a violation of Section 76-5-301.1; rape of a child, 
a violation of Section 76-5-402.1; object rape of a 
child, a violation of Section 76-5-402.3; sodomy upon 
a child, a violation of Section 76-5-403.1; or sexual 
abuse of a child, a violation of Section 76-5-404.1; or 
an attempt to commit any of those offenses, that the 
actor mistakenly believed the victim to be 14 years of 
age or older at the time of the alleged offense or was 
unaware of the victim's true age. 
(2) It is not a defense to the crime of unlawful sex-
ual intercourse, a violation of Section 76-5-401, or an 
a t t empt to commit tha t crime, tha t the actor mistak-
enly believed the victim to be 16 years of age or older 
a t the t ime of the alleged offense or was unaware of 
the victim's t rue age. 1983 
76-2-305. Mental illness — Use as a defense — 
Influence of alcohol or other substance 
voluntarily consumed — Definition. 
n \ ft is a defense to a prosecution under any stat-
element of the offense charged. Mental illness is not 
otherwise a defense. 
(2) The defense defined in this section includes the 
defenses known as "insanity" and "diminished men-
tal capacity." 
(3) A person who is under the influence of volun-
tarily consumed or injected alcohol, controlled sub-
stances, or volatile substances at the time of the al-
leged offense is not excused from criminal responsi-
bility on the basis of mental illness. 
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or de-
fect. A mental defect may be a congenital condition or 
one the result of injury or a residual effect of a physi-
cal or mental disease. Mental illness does not mean a 
personality or character disorder or abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal conduct. 1986 
76-2-306. Voluntary intoxication. 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a 
criminal charge unless such intoxication negates the 
existence of the mental state which is an element of 
the offense; however, if recklessness or criminal neg-
ligence establishes an element of an offense and the 
actor is unaware of the risk because of voluntary in-
toxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a prose-
cution for that offense. 1973 
76-2-307. Voluntary termination of efforts prior 
to offense. 
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution in 
which an actor's criminal responsibility arises from 
his own conduct or from being a party to an offense 
under Section 76-2-201 [76-2-202] that prior to the 
commission of the offense, the actor voluntarily ter-
minated his effort to promote or facilitate its commis-
sion and either: 
(1) Gave timely warning to the proper law en-
forcement authorities or the intended victim; or 
(2) Wholly deprives h is prior efforts of effec-
t iveness in t he commission. 1973 
76-2-308. Affirmative defenses. 
Defenses enumerated in this part constitute affir-
mative defenses. 1973 
PART 4 
JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Section 
76-2-401. Justification as defense — When al-
lowed. 
76-2-402. Force in defense of person — Forcible 
felony defined. 
76-2-403. Force in arrest. 
76-2-404. Peace officer's use of deadly force. 
76-2-405. Force in defense of habitation. 
76-2-406. Force in defense of property. 
76-2-401. Justification as defense — When al-
lowed. 
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecu-
tion for any offense based on the conduct. The defense 
of justification may be claimed: 
(1) When the actor's conduct is in defense of 
persons or property under the circumstances de-
scribed in Sections 76-2-402 through 76-2-406 of 
this part; 
(2) When the actor's conduct is reasonable and 
;~ f.,ifiiim«»nt. of his duties as a governmental of-
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that persons operating the closed circuit equip-
ment film both the child and the defendant dur-
ing the child's testimony, so that the jury may 
view both the child and the defendant, if that 
may be arranged without violation of other re-
quirements of Subsection (2) 
(3) In any case concerning a charge of child abuse 
or of a sexual offense against a child, the court may 
order, upon motion of the prosecution and for good 
cause shown, that the testimony of any witness or 
victim younger than 14 years of age be taken outside 
the courtroom and be recorded That testimony is ad-
missible as evidence, for viewing in any court pro-
ceeding regarding the charges if the provisions of 
Subsection (2) are observed, in addition to the follow-
ing provisions 
(a) the recording is both visual and aural and 
recorded on film or videotape or by other elec-
tronic means, 
(b) the recording equipment is capable of mak-
ing an accurate recording, the operator is compe-
tent, and the recording is accurate and is not al-
tered, 
(c) each voice on the recording is identified, 
and 
(d) each party is given an opportunity to view 
the recording before it is shown in the courtroom 
(4) If the court orders that the testimony of a child 
be taken under Subsection (2) or (3), the child may 
not be required to testify in court at any proceeding 
where the recorded testimony is used 1968 
77-35-16. Rule 16 — Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor 
shall disclose to the defense upon request the follow-
ing material or information of which he has knowl-
edge 
(L) Relevant written or recorded statements of 
the defendant or co-defendants, 
(2) The criminal record of the defendant, 
(3) Physical evidence seized from the defen-
dant or co-defendant, 
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate 
the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree 
of the offense for reduced punishment, and 
(6) Any other item of evidence which the court 
determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the defendant in order for the defen-
dant to adequately prepare his defense 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as 
soon as practicable following the filing of charges and 
before the defendant is required to plead The prose-
cutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, 
the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor such infor-
mation as required by statute relating to alibi or in-
sanity and any other item of evidence which the court 
determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor 
to adequately prepare his case 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attor-
ney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before 
trial or as soon as practicable He has a continuing 
duty to make disclosure 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the 
prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by notify-
ing the opposing party that material and information 
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reason-
able times and places 
stncted, or deferred, or make such other order as is 
appropriate Upon motion by a party, the court may 
permit the party to make such showing, in whole or 
in part, in the form of a written statement to be in-
spected by the judge alone If the court enters an or-
der granting relief following such an ex parte show 
mg, the entire text of the party's statement shall be 
sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be 
made available to the appellate court in the event of 
an appeal 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceed 
mgs it is brought to the attention of the court that a 
party has failed to comply with this rule, the court 
may order such party to permit the discovery or in-
spection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party 
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may 
enter such other order as it deems just under the cir-
cumstances 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the ac 
cused may be required to 
(1) Appear in a lineup, 
(2) Speak for identification, 
(3) Submit to fingerprinting or the making of 
other bodily impressions, 
(4) Pose for photographs not involving reenact-
ment of the crime, 
(5) Try on articles of clothing or other items of 
disguise, 
(6) Permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, 
fingernail scrapings, and other bodily materials 
which can be obtained without unreasonable in-
trusion, 
(7) Provide specimens of handwriting, 
(8) Submit to reasonable physical or medical 
inspection of his body, and 
(9) Cut hair or allow hair to grow to approxi-
mate appearance at the time of the alleged of-
fense 
Whenever the personal appearance,, of the ac-
cused" is required'for ^e^re^omgjaurposes , rea-
sonable notice of the timelimljiTace of such appear-
ance~shalll>e g ivenlo lhe accuseoTandIns c o u n s e l ^ 
Failure of the accused to appear Or to comply with 
the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by 
order of the court, without reasonable excuse shall 
be grounds for revocation of pre-trial release, may 
be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in 
chief for consideration along with other evidence 
concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be 
subject to such further sanctions as the court 
should deem appropriate i960 
77-35-17. Rule 17 — The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel The 
defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
with the following exceptions 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and in-
fractions, defendant may consent in writing to 
trial in his absence, 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable 
by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from 
the trial after notice to defendant of the time for 
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried 
and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall 
have the same effect as if defendant had been 
present, and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defen 
d f l n t f r o m frrml for anrA r -nnuo oliAiwn t»/W»i~U m »« 
